January 5, 2025
Hon. Anita Anand
Minister of Transport
Government of Canada
Ottawa
We’ve watched with concern the recent runway overshoots – at Vancouver on November 19, and more recently, at Muaun International Airport in South Korea.
The Vancouver aircraft overshot runway 08L by approximately 572m, becoming stuck in mud.
The South Korean disaster, with 179 fatalities, resulted from the aircraft crashing into a concrete wall 250m from the end of the runway.
Both of those airports have runway end safety areas (RESAs) far longer than those at Toronto’s Island Airport [1]
If either of those incidents had occurred at the Island Airport, there would have been a high risk of multiple fatalities:
The current Island Airport’s RESAs are only 106m [2].
No Ministry regulation addresses the unique safety challenges presented by an airport bounded by water.
The Q400, used by Porter and Air Canada, already pushes the limits of the existing 1216m 08/26 runway – its manufacturer specifies a minimum landing field length of 1268m [3].
Construction of appropriate 300m RESAs at the Island Airport, as Vancouver Airport has done, would be unjustifiably expensive, and would destroy much of Toronto’s valuable waterfront.
The only viable choice is to close the Airport.
Our deputation to Toronto City Council’s Executive Committee last fall included this:
We are surprised, of course, that the Airport operates now.
Ports Toronto has known, ever since the Air France runway overshoot at Pearson, that its runway end safety areas were inadequate, and an overshoot could readily end up in deep water, with potential for fatalities.
This Airport does not become unsafe in 2027 – it is unsafe now.
It is a shame that Ports Toronto (and Transport Canada) have dithered on this issue for so many years, creating a sense of urgency that ought not to be facing you.
It was August 2, 2005, when Air France flight 358 ran off the end of the runway at Pearson.
The Transportation Safety Board investigated that overshoot and recommended that
“The Department of Transport require all Code 4 runways to have a 300 m runway end safety area (RESA) or a means of stopping aircraft that provides an equivalent level of safety.”
It noted that that 300m is the ICAO Annex 14 recommended practice and the FAA's runway safety area standard [4].
It took your Ministry until 2011 to commence an internal risk assessment.
That assessment was completed three years later, but your Ministry has only recently imposed inadequate 150 m RESAs by, for the Island Airport, 2027.
The only method capable of stopping an aircraft from overshooting and ending up in deep water, is an Engineered Material Arresting System [5], commonly used in US airports. Its use has been rejected by Ports Toronto.
Your Ministry has always known that overshoots at the Island Airport can end up in deep water, with significant potential for fatalities.
For commercial airports in Canada, the Island Airport is essentially alone in facing that risk.
It has ignored that risk, as it has ignored the real safety risk, again unique to the Toronto Island Airport, of inadequate emergency access in the event of a crash [6].
Travellers using the Island Airport are indeed fortunate that there have been no runway overshoots or crashes - to date.
Why has PortsToronto and your Ministry been so cavalier about safety at the Island Airport?
Why is this Airport still operating?
Given the facts, none of us will be able to say – "We didn't know!" – if or when a catastrophic landing overshoot happens at the Island Airport. We have been very fortunate that no such overshoot has happened but the only way to ensure this never happens is if the Island Airport is closed.
The land it occupies would provide far more value as a world class park and cultural destination for the benefit of the citizens of Toronto and Canada.
This Airport needs to be closed NOW.
Brian Iler
Spokesperson for Parks not Planes
[1] About 106 metres of suitable terrain is available at the Island Airport off both runway ends
[2] Per Ports Toronto August 12, 2016, submission to Transport Canada
[3] See de Haviland Specifications
[4] The TSB also noted:
The Board is aware that requiring a 300 m RESA may affect many existing Code 4 runways that are located where natural obstacles, local development, and/or environmental constraints make the construction of a RESA of this length impracticable. The Board believes that there exists a requirement for an alternate means of compliance, such as the use of an engineered material arresting system to provide a level of safety that is equivalent to a 300 m RESA.
[5] FAA report
[6] Safety experts (their report, obtained from Transport Canada files) have established basic requirements that cannot be met without a bridge:
Any option must permit 64 emergency vehicles and 201 personnel to access an aircraft crash within 20 minutes. In addition, ambulances with the critically injured must be capable of returning to the mainland within a 30 minute period of time.
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